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Policy Alternatives for the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic 
At present, the policy options of the Central Bank are limited by the 
necessity of financing the fiscal deficit of the central government. 
Although the exact magnitude of the fiscal deficit for 1989 is not known 
with certainty, there are several estimates that place the deficit within 
the range of 3 to 6 percent of gross domestic product. In this paper, I 
will attempt to examine the alternatives facing the Central Bank in 
financing the deficit. Some familiarity with my accompanying paper, 
"Central Bank Policy and Macroeconomic Adjustment in a Commodity-Exporting 
Economy", will be . helpful in reading this paper. 
1. Financing the Fiscal Deficit 
To finance the fiscal deficit, the Central Bank must rely primarily on 
the inflation tax. The inflation tax has three components whose size is 
determined by the · inflation rate, the reserve ratio on demand deposits, and 
the reserve ratio on time deposits. Over the long run, the tax on currency 
is equal to the nominal interest rate (w + r) times the stock of currency 
(c): c(w + r). The tax on demand deposits is equal to the reserve ratio on 
demand deposits (r) times the nominal interest rate times the amount of 
demand deposits: rd(w + r). And the tax on time deposits is equal to the 
reserve ratio on time deposits (~) times the nominal interest rate times the 
amount of time deposits (t): ~t(w + r). The accompanying paper ("Central 
Bank Policy and Macreconomic Adjustment in a Commodity-Exporting Economy") 
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shows that revenue from the inflation tax can be expressed alternatively as 
follows, where rd is the real interest rate paid on demand deposits, r 1 is 
the real interest rate charged on bank loans, and 1 is the quantity of bank 
loans: 
R <~ + r)c + (r - rd)d + (r1 - r)l (1) 
Figure 1 illustrates the three components of the inflation tax. Shaded 
area A is the tax on currency, shaded area B is the tax on demand deposits, 
and shaded area D is the tax on loans. Time deposits cannot be taxed as 
easily as demand deposits or loans because time deposits are held as a store 
of wealth. Consequently, banks must pay a competitive rate of return on 
time deposits, thereby shifting the reserve tax on time deposits to 
borrowers from the banks. 
Since the Central Bank has never previously faced the prospect of 
financing such large fiscal deficits, it may be instructive to examine the 
manner by which the Chilean Central Bank collected inflation tax revenue 
during the period 1975 - 1980. In 1975 the Chilean government was running a 
large fiscal deficit that had worsened as a result of a halving of 
international copper prices. Lack of access to international credit markets 
dictated a heavy reliance on the inflation tax, so that during the first 
half of 1975 the inflation rate accelerated to an annual rate of over 600 
percent. In mid-1975 the government undertook major cuts in expenditures 
that slowed the inflation rate to an annual level of under 200 percent 
during the second half of the year. Even with the cuts in fiscal 
expenditure, the Central Bank was forced in 1975 to intervene in the Savings 
and Loan System (SINAP). The resulting expansion of domestic credit during 
the next three years to finance the intervention was one of the principal 
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causes for the large size of the inflation tax imposed by the Central Bank 
during these years. 
In August 1975 the Chilean government deregulated interest rates in the 
banking sector. Table 1 provides figures from the period of interest rate 
deregulation in August 1975 to the end of 1980 that illustrate how the 
Chilean government used required reserves on demand deposits and time 
deposits in conjunction with the nominal interest rate to generate inflation 
tax revenue during a period of improving fiscal finances. 
The first three columns show that reserve requirements on both demand 
deposits and time deposits were lowered over a five year period as the 
nominal interest rate declined (in conjunction with a decline in the 
inflation rate). Column (4) shows that the Chilean government taxed time 
deposits at a much lower rate than currency or demand deposits, although the 
tax rate [column (2) times the difference between columns (3) and (4)) was 
still 19 percent in 1976. Comparison of the first and second columns also 
shows that improving government finances were used to lower the reserve 
ratio on time deposits before reducing the reserve ratio on demand deposits. 
The increase in financial assets as a percentage of GDP shown in columns (5) 
through (7) is consistent with the reduced taxation of those assets. The 
continued low level of demand deposits in 1979 as well as the large increase 
between 1979 and 1980 suggest the positive impact for real demand deposit 
balances of the sharp reduction in the demand deposit reserve ratio between 
1979 and 1980. 
Columns (8) through (10) divide the Chilean government's inflation tax 
revenue into its currency component, demand deposit component, and time 
deposit component. Revenue from the time deposit component was relatively 
small, since the government was using interest-bearing reserve requirements 
19751 
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Table 1: Inflation Tax Revenue in Chile: 1975-1980 
(All Figures are in Percentage Terms) 
Short-Term Interest 
Legal Reserve Legal Reserve (30-day) Paid on Demand 
Ratio on Ratio on Nominal Time Deposit Currency DeEosits 
Demand Deposits Time Deposits Interest Rate Reserves2 GDP GDP 
(1) 
80 
83 
70 
47 
42 
16 
Currency Component 
(col. 3) (col. 5) 
(8) 
4.05 
3.05 
1. 97 
1. 47 
1. 08 
0.93 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
82 234 195 1. 73 2.12 
58 198 166 1. 54 1.99 
36 100 85 1. 97 2.35 
20 64 58 2.30 2.47 
15 46 30 2.34 2.27 
4 39 0 2.38 3.08 
(Inflation Tax Revenue)/GDP 
Demand Deposit Component 
(col. 1) (col. 3) (col. 6) 
(9) 
3.97 
3.27 
1.65 
0.74 
0.44 
0.19 
Time Deposit Component 
(col. 3-col. 4) (col. 2) (col. 7) 
(10) 
0.67 
0.66 
0.32 
0.09 
0.22 
0.17 
. ~ 
Time DeEOS : 
Total 
(11) 
8.7 
7.0 
3.9 
2.3 
1. 7 
1. 3 
GDP 
(7) 
2.09 
3.54 
5.88 
7.26 
9.08 
10.60 
Source: Columns (1)-(4) are taken from various issues of the Banco Central de Chile, Bolet1n 
Mensual. Columns (5)-(7) are taken from various issues of the International Monetary 
Fund, International Financial Statistics, using mid-year data for currency, demand 
deposits, and time deposits. 
1Figures are for August-December (annualized). 
2The Central Bank stopped paying interest on time deposit reserves in September 1979. 
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on time deposits to provide deficit financing. During the first two years 
revenue from the inflation tax on currency and demand deposits was about 
equal in magnitude, while during the last four years tax revenue from demand 
deposits was gradually reduced relative to tax revenue from currency. 
During the period from 1975 to 1980 inflation tax revenue was lowered from 
8.7 percent ofGDP to 1.3 percent of GDP. 
The 1988 Increase in Reserve Requirements in the Dominican Republic 
In 1988 the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic substantially raised 
the effective reserve ratio on bank deposits. Table 2 shows figures in real 
terms of the changes in bank loans, bank reserves, demand deposits, and time 
deposits for the banking system. The figures show that bank reserves rose 
substantially at the same time that bank loans, demand deposits, and time 
deposits all fell in real terms. 
Table 2 
The Consequences of Raising Reserve Requirements 
in the Dominican Republic 
Bank Bank Demand Time Reserves 
Year Loans Reserves Deposits Deposits Total Deposits 
1987 537 61 266 374 9.5 
1988 477 198 254 301 35.7 
Change -60 +137 -12 -73 
Source: Dominican Republic Central Bank 
Note: All figures have been expressed in real terms by deflating nominal 
values by the GDP deflater. 
(%) 
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According to the model developed in "Central Bank Policy ... ", the 
change (A) in bank loans (1) should approximately equal one minus the 
reserve ratio (r) on demand deposits times the change in demand deposits 
plus one minus the reserve ratio (1) on time deposits times the change in 
time deposits: Al - (1 - r)Ad + (1 - 1)At. Setting the two reserve ratios 
equal to .3, the formula suggests that bank loans should have decreased by 
59.5: Al - .7(-12) + .7(-73) - - 59.5. The actual reduction in loans of 60 
is consistent with the model's predictions. 
The effects of the increase in the reserve ratios on the banking system 
are shown in Figure 2. The horizontal axis shows the decline in loans from 
537 to 477 that was produced primarily by the increase in the reserve ratio 
on time deposits. The horizontal axis also shows the decline in demand 
deposits from 266 to 254. The vertical axis shows that the higher reserve 
ratios led to a higher real lending rate and a lower real return on demand 
deposits (including the service component of returns on demand deposits). 
As in Figure 1, the area of the rectangles measures the inflation tax 
revenue going to the government. 
Specific Suggestions to the Dominican Central Bank 
If the Dominican Central Bank is forced to finance a fiscal deficit 
that is on the order of 4 percent of GDP, Table 1 suggests that the year 
1977 for Chile provides at least a rough indicator of the types of measures 
that the Central Bank will have to take. In 1977, the legal reserve ratio 
on demand deposits was 70 percent, the legal reserve ratio on time deposits 
was 36 percent, required reserves on time deposits were paid about 85 
percent of the market-clearing interest rate~ and the rate of inflation was 
about 84 percent. Total inflation tax revenue was about 3.9 percent of GDP. 
Figure 2. The Contraction of the Dominican Financial 
System Following the Increase in Reserve Requirements 
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The following are four specific suggestions, should the Central Bank be 
forced to finance a large fiscal deficit with the inflation tax: 
(a) Pay interest on required reserves on time deposits. Such an 
action will lower the real lending rate in the banking system. Lower real 
lending rates will aid production and lower the rate of debtor defaults. 
Reducing the default rate is particularly important, since bank 
interventions by the Central Bank are very costly and imply an increased 
level of the inflation tax to finance the intervention. 
(b) Aim at lower rates of inflation than the Chileans . The Chileans 
had effectively indexed their whole economy, including tax collections, to 
the price level. In the Dominican Republic, higher inflation will probably 
lower real tax revenue because of collection lags, thereby worsening the 
fiscal deficit. This advice means that reserve requirements may have to be 
raised to high levels, although not to levels that exceed the base-
maximizing levels (see "Central Bank Policy ... " for a discussion of this 
point). 
(c) Deregulate the banking system carefully. Keeping interest rates 
at low levels robs the Central Bank of inflation tax revenue, since the low 
interest rates create rents that are transfered to the banks rather than to 
the Central Bank. Rather than allowing complete deregulation of interest 
rates, the Central Bank should attempt to maintain interest rates that are 
positive in real terms. Complete deregulation will probably increase the 
problem of moral hazard in the banking system, where marginal banks pay high 
rates of interest and invest in overly risky projects. 
(d) In the long run revenue from the inflation tax is equal to 
<~ + r)h, where h - c + rd + ~t is the monetary base. In the short run, 
however, revenue from the inflation tax is hn + h. Between December 1987 
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and December 1988 the Dominican Central Bank raised the real size of the 
monetary base by 48 percent (equal to the rate of growth of 103 percent of 
the nominal base minus the rate of inflation of 55 percent). This increase 
was accomplished by raising the effective reserve ratio on bank deposits, 
since currency fell by 8 percent in real terms during this period while bank 
reserves rose by 58 percent in real terms. Assuming that the monetary base 
is roughly 8.5 percent of GDP, the 48 percent increase in the real size of 
the monetary base was equivalent to about 4.2 percent of GDP. 
Such increases in the size of the base (h > 0) can only be useful as 
one-time revenue-raising measures. The Dominican Central Bank could 
engineer another one-time increase in the base by lengthening the time that 
the Central Bank holds prior import deposits (depositos previos). In that 
way, the stock of prior import deposits held at the Central bank would rise, 
thereby leading to a one-time ability to finance part of a fiscal deficit 
without causing a large increase in the inflation rate. 
Table 3 (taken from P. Brock, "Inflationary Finance in an Open 
Economy," Journal of Monetary Economics 1984) shows the use of prior import 
deposits by ten countries during the 1970s. The size of prior import 
deposits relative to the monetary base rose to high levels in several 
countries, frequently reaching 25 percent of the monetary base. 
As in the case of the imposition of reserve requirements, reliance on 
prior import deposits as a source of finance creates important distortions 
in the functioning of the economy. Both reserve requirements and prior 
import deposits should be avoided unless the Central Bank has no other 
alternative ways of managing the financing of the fiscal deficit. 
P.L Brock, lnjla1io11aryfina11ce in w1 open econumy 
Tahle 3 
Prior import deposits (as a percentage of monctal)' base). a 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 197~ 197Q 19!<0 
llrazil 3.7 4.9 5.5 5.0 8.0 25.5 19.9 20.3 15.3 4.3 
Colomhia 12.2 11.7 12.9 11.3 5.0 1.7 6.4 4.9 6.4 6.2 
Ecuador 11.9 15.l 0.2 0.1 6.3 D.l 12.5 9.6 8.9 9.9 
Paraguay 3.1 2.3 2.9 2.9 2.1 2.4 rn 3.6 3.!< 2.9 
Uruguay 16.5 22.9 21.4 24.0 7.6 0.6 0.1 
Burundi 5.7 10.3 10.8 10.1 lU 9.0 7.9 9.8 6.9 7.8 
Ghana 27.2 35.5 25.2 17.6 14.6 10.R 11.5 11.7 12.9 7.4 
Iran 8.1 12.4 15.8 30.8 24.2 17.7 17.0 n.a. HI.I 9.9 
Korea 0.5 1.9 2.8 7.6 16.7 15.3 8.4 3.7 4.8 10.5 
Zaire 3.5 3.2 3.3 13.8 6.3 6.8 23.9 27 .8 3>'-2 17.7 
a source: /11rcmaticmal Financial Srati.Hics. various issues. 
The monetary base equals reserve money plus prior import deposit~ (lines 14 plus H1b). 
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2. Exchange Rate Policy 
If the Central Bank does have to finance a large fiscal deficit, a 
fixed exchange rate policy will not be credible or sustainable. The Central 
Bank should maintain exchange controls and adopt a crawling peg exchange 
rate regime that is consistent with the rate of domestic credit creation. 
The Central Bank probably has been able to maintain a fixed exchange 
rate since July 1988 because of several factors. First, the rise in reserve 
ratios has allowed the Central Bank to finance the deficit without creating 
upward pressure on the exchange rate. Second, the rise in tariffs or tariff 
equivalents has raised the price of importables and probably has raised the 
relative price of nontradables (see the discussion in "Central Bank 
Policy ... "). The favorable agreement with Falconbridge has improved the 
country's terms of trade and put upward pressure on the relative price of 
nontradables. So too has the government's public works program. 
Figure 3 is taken from my accompanying paper ("Central Bank 
Policy ... "). Figure 3 shows that the higher tariff as well as other forces 
that raise the relative price of nontradables cause the exchange rate to 
appreciate under a floating rate system from Eo to E3 . Under a fixed rate 
system a higher tariff and rising relative price of nontradables causes an 
inflow of international reserves. Under a floating rate system, the 
exchange rate overshoots as a result of an initial expansion of nontraded 
investment that declines over time. After the initial overshooting, the 
exchange rate depreciates from E3 to E4 . Under a fixed exchange rate, the 
pressures for depreciation produce a decline in international reserves. 
The market clearing equation for the exchange rate is the following 
(see Figure 3 and the paper "Central Bank Policy ... "): 
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Figure 3 . Exchange Rate Overshooting Following an Increa~e 
in the Tariff (~), an Improvement in the Terms of Trade (8), 
Increased Transfers from the Rest of the World (Z), and an 
Expansion of Nontraded Government Purchases (Gn) 
Rela~i ye 
Suppli w 
H-t 
-H 
9 
h* p*;pm* 
il . (l + Q)Ppl-P 
h* 
h • RER , 
• 
(2) 
where RER is the real effective exchange rate. 
Equation (2) can be rewritten in percentage change terms as follows, 
where a caret (A) over a variable denotes the percentage change in that 
variable: 
E + A* - A £* - h + RER (3) 
Michael Connolly has calculated (Figure 2 of "Exchange Rate Policy in 
the Dominican Republic") that the Dominican Real Exchange Rate appreciated 
by 28 percent between July 1988 and February 1989. Equation (3) shows that 
the 28 percent appreciation of the real effective exchange rate allowed the 
Central Bank to increase the monetary base by about 28 percent without 
putting pressure on the exchange rate. Such an increase is equal to about 
2.2 percent of GDP. When the increase of the monetary base caused by the 
increase of reserve requirements (h - 48 percent) is added to equation (3), 
it is apparent that the Central Bank has been able to provide non-
inflationary financing of the fiscal deficit on the order of about 6.6 
percent of GDP. 
It is very likely that the appreciation of the real effective exchange 
rate will reverse itself as the relative price of nontradables falls. In 
that case, the Central Bank will lose international reserves and face 
increasing pressure to devalue. It would be far better to begin a crawling 
peg exchange rate regime while the Central Bank has reserves and to plan for 
a real devaluation (an increase in the real effective exchange rate) over 
the next year. There are many role models for the Dominican Central Bank to 
follow. My favorite is the system used by Colombia since 1967. 
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3. Consequences for the Financial System 
Imposing a large inflation tax could potentially cause much damage to 
the financial system. It would be wise to pay positive real interest rates 
on time deposits, but not to liberalize the entire financial system. 
If granted the authority, the Central Bank should try to bring the 
parallel financial market into the formal system. There are two reasons for 
doing this. First, by formalizing the parallel market the Central Bank will 
be in a better position to impose the inflation tax on the parallel market, 
thereby broadening the base for the inflation tax. Second, when 
institutions fail in the parallel market, they will likely receive aid from 
the Central Bank. This aid expands the stock of domestic credit and adds to 
the inflation tax that the Central Bank has to levy. By placing the 
institutions of the parallel market under Central Bank control, the Central 
Bank will have a better opportunity of enforcing standards of prudent 
conduct that lower the chances of large-scale bankruptcy in the parallel 
market. 
4. Conclusion 
All of the measures described in this paper are designed to make the 
best of a bad situation. It is clear that fiscal finances need to be 
reformed in order to allow the Central Bank to perform its traditional role 
in the Dominican economy without having to finance large fiscal deficits. 
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